Frances Egan Associate Professor Contact Information Office: Davison Hall 113 Email: Phone: (732) 932-9861 x157

Education

B.A. and M.A., University of Manitoba; Ph.D., University of Western Ontario

Speciality

Phil. of Mind, Phil. of Psychology, Foundations of Cognitive Science

Research

I am interested in the nature of psychological explanation, both scientific and commonsense, and the relation between the two. My recent work has focused on computational models of our cognitive capacities, developing an account of the role of representational content in such models. I also have research interests in perception in general, and the theory of vision in particular, including the history of vision, and in computational neuroscience.

Selected Publications

"Wide Content," forthcoming in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, A. Beckerman and B. McLaughlin, eds., Oxford University Press. "The Content of Color Experience," forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. "Is There a Role for Representational Content is Scientific Psychology?," forthcoming in Stich and His Critics, M.Bishop and D.Murphy, eds., Blackwells. "Doing Cognitive Neuroscience: A Third Way," Synthese, 153 (2006), pp.337-91. (Co-authored with Robert Matthews.) "Naturalistic Inquiry: Where Does Mental Representation Fit In?," in Chomsky and His Critics, L.Antony and N.Hornstein, eds., Blackwells, 2003, pp.89-104. "In Defense of Narrow Mindedness," Mind and Language 14 (1999), pp.177-94. "The Moon Illusion," Philosophy of Science 65 (1998), pp.604-23. "Folk Psychology and Cognitive Architecture," Philosophy of Science 62 (1995), pp.179-96. "Computation and Content," The Philosophical Review 104 (1995), pp.181-203. "Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content," Mind 101, (1992), pp.443-59. "Must Psychology be Individualistic?," The Philosophical Review 100 (1991), pp.179-203. "Propositional Attitudes and the Language of Thought," The Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), 379-388. "What's Wrong with the Syntactic Theory of Mind," Philosophy of Science 56 (1989), pp.664-74.