Brian McLaughlin

Brian P. McLaughlin
Professor II; Director of the Rutgers Center for Philosophy and the Sciences

Contact Information
Office: Seminary 1 - 311
Email: brianmc@rci.rutgers.edu
Phone: (732) 932-9861
Education
Ph.D., North Carolina
Speciality
Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophical Logic
Research and Professional Activities
 
Publications
Edited Books
  • Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1985). (Wirh Ernest LePore)
  • Perspectives on Self-Deception, co-edited with Amelie O. Rorty (University of California Press, 1988). Pp.1-9. (With Amelie O. Rorty.)
  • Dretske and His Critics, editor (Blackwell, 1991). Pp.ix-xvii.
  • Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, forthcoming). (With Ansgar Beckermann.)
  • Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, forthcoming). (With Jonathan Cohen.)
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
  • "Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spindel Issue on Supervenience, (1984):73-91.
  • "Perception, Causation, and Supervenience," Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 9, (1984):569-91.
  • "Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental," in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson , (Blackwell, 1985), pp.331-68.
  • "Actions, Reasons, Causes, and Intentions," in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson , (Blackwell, 1985), pp.3-13. (With Ernest LePore.)
  • "What is Wrong with Correlational Psychosemantics," Synthese , 70, (1987):271-86.
  • "Tye on Connectionism," Southern Journal of Philosophy , 26, Spindel Issue on Connectionism, (1987):185-93.
  • "Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief," in Perspectives on Self-Deception (University of California Press, 1988), pp.29-62.
  • "Mele's Irrationality: a commentary," Philosophical Psychology , 2, (1988):189-200.
  • "Why Perception is not Singular Reference," in Cause, Mind, and Reality , ed. John Heil (Kluwer, 1989), pp.111-20.
  • "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," Philosophical Perspectives, 3, (1989):109-34. [Reprinted in Mind and Cognition: A Reader, ed. William Lycan (Blackwell).]
  • "Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work," Cognition, 35, (1990):183-204. (With Jerry Fodor.) [Reprinted in Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, eds. Terence Horgan and John Tienson (Kluwer, 1992). Reprinted in The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, eds. C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (Blackwell, 1995). And reprinted in Fodor's In Critical Condition (MIT/Bradford Book, 1998.]
  • "Incontient Belief," The Journal of Philosophical Research, XV, (1990):115-26.
  • "Belief Individuation and Dretske on Naturalizing Content," in Dretske and His Critics, (Blackwell, 1991), pp.157-179.
  • "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism," in Emergence Or Reduction? Eds. A. Berckermann, J. Kim, and H. Flohr. (De Gruyter, 1992), pp.49-93.
  • "On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism," in Mental Causation, eds. A. Mele and J. Heil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.27-40.
  • "Time Frames, Voluntary Acts, and Strict Liability," Law and Philosophy, 12, (1993):163-90.
  • "On Punctate Content and Conceptual Role," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3, (1993):653-60.
  • "The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls," Philosophical Studies, 71, (1993):163-90.
  • "Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution," Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement no.34 (1993):217-34. [Reprinted in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, eds. C. Hookway and D. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.217-34.]
  • "The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined," Synthese, 101, (1994):365-400. (With T.A. Warfield.)
  • "Distinctions Without a Difference," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33, Spindel Issue on Vagueness, (1994):203-53. (With Vann McGee.)
  • "Dennett's Logical Behaviorism," Philosophical Topics, 22, (1994):189-258. (With John Hawthorne.)
  • "Epiphenomenalism," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Guttenplan (Blackwell, 1994), pp.275-286.
  • "The Public/Private Distinction," in A Companion to Metaphysics, eds. J. Kim and E. Sosa (Blackwell, 1994), pp.421-23.
  • "Dispositions," in A Companion to Metaphysics, eds. J. Kim and E. Sosa (Blackwell, 1994), pp.120-123.
  • "Varieties of Supervenience," in Supervenience: New Essays, eds. E. Savello and O Yalcin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.16-59. [Reprinted in Essays in Analytical Metaphysics, ed. Michael Tooley (Garland Publishing), 1999. Reprinted in The International Research Library of Philosophy, ed. Jaegwon Kim (Ashgate Publishing Limited), 2002.]
  • "Lewis on What Distinguishes Perception From Hallucination," in Problems in Perception, ed. K. Akins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.198-231.
  • "On the Very Possibility of Self-Deception," Self and Deception, eds. R. Ames and W. Dassayke (SUNY University Press, 1996), pp.11-25.
  • "Classical Constituents in Smolensky's ICS Architecture," Structures and Norms in Science, eds. M.L.D. Chiara, K. Doets, D. Mundici, and J. van Bentham (Kluwer, 1996), pp.331-43.
  • "Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination," Philosophical Perspectives, 11, (1997):209-230.
  • "Emergence and Supervenience," Intellectia, 25, (1997):25-43.
  • "Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge," in Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, eds. C. Wright, C. Macdonald, and B. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Prfess, 1998), pp.285-320. [Section entitled "The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency," reprinted in Anti-Individualism and Self-Knowledge, eds. P. Ludlow and N. Martin (CSLI Publications, Stanford, 1998), pp.207-214.]
  • "Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?" Philosophical Review, 107, (1998):349-380. (With Michael Tye.)
  • "There are Fewer Things Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX, (1999):445-454. (With Christopher Hill.)
  • "Color and Color Space," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol.5, Epistemology (2000), pp.83-89.
  • "Hermeneutique Cosmique," Philosophiques, 27, (2000):63-76.
  • "What Dennett's Intentional Systems Theory Won't Vindicate Folk Psychology," Protosciology, 14, (2000):145-157.
  • "Skepticism, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge," The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. LXXIV, (2000):93-118.
  • "Lessons of the Many," Philosophical Topics, Vol.28, (2000): 129-51. (With Vann McGee.)
  • "Introspecting Thoughts" Facta Philosophica, 3, (2001): 77-83.
  • "In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Horgan and Tienson," in Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. B. Loewer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.317-328. [Reprinted as "Zur Verteidigung des New-Wave Materialismus" in M. Paun and A. Stephan (eds.) Phaenomenales Bewusstsein: Rueckkehr zur Identitaetstheorie? Paderborn: mentis, 2001, pp. 208-221.]
  • "Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness" in ed. Quintin Smith's New Essays on Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.97-154.
  • "Vitalism and Emergence," in Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1870-1945, ed. T. Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 629-637.
  • "Computational, Connectionism, and the Philosophy of Mind," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information ed. L. Floridi (Blackwell, 2003), pp. 135-51.
  • "McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism,' in New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Skepticism, and Self-Knowledge ed. Susana Nuccetelli (Cambridge, Mass. MIT, 2003), pp. 79-96.
  • "A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response To Block's Harder Problem," Philosophical Issues, 13, (2003):163-204.
  • "The Place of Color in Nature," in Colour: Connecting the Mind to the Physical World, eds. R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.475-505.
  • "Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson," Linguistics and Philosophy, 26, (2003):637-650. (With Vann McGee.)
  • "Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism?" Behavorial Brian Sciences, 26, (2003):34-35. (With Zoltan Jakab)
  • "Have Noë and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Program?" Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, (2004):56-67. (With Gary Bartlett)
Encyclopedia and Philosophical Dictionaries
  • "The Philosophy of Mind," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R. Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.597-606.
  • "Mental Causation," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, ed. Borchert (Macmillan, 1996), pp.331-34.
  • "Supervenience," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, ed. Borchert (Macmillan, 1996), pp.558-60.
  • "Epiphenomenalism," in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds. R. Wilson and F. Keil (MIT, 1997), pp.274-276.
  • "Emergence," in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds. R Wilson and F. Keil (MIT, 1997), pp.266-268.
  • "Anomalous Monism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.1, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.276-280.
  • "Perception: Epistemic Issues," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.276-280.
  • "Connectionism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.570-579.
  • "Information Semantics," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.659-662.
  • "Physicalism and Alternatives," International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences eds. N.J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (Pergamon, Oxford 2001), pp.11422-11427.
  • "Supervenience," Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Macmillan), in press.
  • "Supervenience," Stanford On Line Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University Press), in preparation.
Book Reviews
  • Review of Brian Loar's Mind and Meaning, in Review of Metaphysics (1987): 589-90.
  • Review of Fred Dretske's Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, C, Philosophical Review (1991): 641-45.
  • Review of Tim Crane's The Contents of Experience, in Canadian Philosophical Review, xiii, (1993): 8-13. (With Gene Witmer.)
  • Review of Patricia Churchland and Terence Sejnowski's The Computational Brain, in The Philosophy of Science, 63, (1996): 137-39.
  • Review of Stephen White's The Unity of the Self, in The Journal of Philosophy, 97, (1997): 638-44.
  • Review of Timothy Williamson's Vagueness, in Linguistics and Philosophy, 21, (1998): 221-231. (With Vann McGee)
  • "Why Tom Sawyer Stood on His Head," a review of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits, in Times Literary Supplement, July 14, 2002, pp. 12-13. (With John Hawthorne.)

 


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  • Howard McGary Presented 2019 Clement A. Price Human Dignity Award

    We're happy to announce that Howard McGary, Professor of Philosophy, received a 2019 Clement A. Price Human Dignity Award for outstanding commitment to diversity and inclusion through his work with the annual Summer Institute for Diversity in Philosophy for 25 years. The Institute provides outreach to undergraduates on a nationwide basis to increase the number of underrepresented minority students in philosophy graduate programs and faculty positions. Meeting every summer for the last two...

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