Brian McLaughlin

Brian P. McLaughlin
Professor II; Director of the Rutgers Center for Philosophy and the Sciences

Contact Information
Office: Seminary 1 - 311
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Phone: (732) 932-9861
Ph.D., North Carolina
Philosophy of Mind, Metaphysics, Epistemology, Philosophical Logic
Research and Professional Activities
Edited Books
  • Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1985). (Wirh Ernest LePore)
  • Perspectives on Self-Deception, co-edited with Amelie O. Rorty (University of California Press, 1988). Pp.1-9. (With Amelie O. Rorty.)
  • Dretske and His Critics, editor (Blackwell, 1991). Pp.ix-xvii.
  • Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Mind (Oxford, forthcoming). (With Ansgar Beckermann.)
  • Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind (Blackwell, forthcoming). (With Jonathan Cohen.)
Journal Articles and Book Chapters
  • "Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation," Southern Journal of Philosophy, Spindel Issue on Supervenience, (1984):73-91.
  • "Perception, Causation, and Supervenience," Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 9, (1984):569-91.
  • "Anomalous Monism and the Irreducibility of the Mental," in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson , (Blackwell, 1985), pp.331-68.
  • "Actions, Reasons, Causes, and Intentions," in Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson , (Blackwell, 1985), pp.3-13. (With Ernest LePore.)
  • "What is Wrong with Correlational Psychosemantics," Synthese , 70, (1987):271-86.
  • "Tye on Connectionism," Southern Journal of Philosophy , 26, Spindel Issue on Connectionism, (1987):185-93.
  • "Exploring the Possibility of Self-Deception in Belief," in Perspectives on Self-Deception (University of California Press, 1988), pp.29-62.
  • "Mele's Irrationality: a commentary," Philosophical Psychology , 2, (1988):189-200.
  • "Why Perception is not Singular Reference," in Cause, Mind, and Reality , ed. John Heil (Kluwer, 1989), pp.111-20.
  • "Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical," Philosophical Perspectives, 3, (1989):109-34. [Reprinted in Mind and Cognition: A Reader, ed. William Lycan (Blackwell).]
  • "Connectionism and the Problem of Systematicity: Why Smolensky's Solution Doesn't Work," Cognition, 35, (1990):183-204. (With Jerry Fodor.) [Reprinted in Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, eds. Terence Horgan and John Tienson (Kluwer, 1992). Reprinted in The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation, eds. C. Macdonald and G. Macdonald (Blackwell, 1995). And reprinted in Fodor's In Critical Condition (MIT/Bradford Book, 1998.]
  • "Incontient Belief," The Journal of Philosophical Research, XV, (1990):115-26.
  • "Belief Individuation and Dretske on Naturalizing Content," in Dretske and His Critics, (Blackwell, 1991), pp.157-179.
  • "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism," in Emergence Or Reduction? Eds. A. Berckermann, J. Kim, and H. Flohr. (De Gruyter, 1992), pp.49-93.
  • "On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism," in Mental Causation, eds. A. Mele and J. Heil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp.27-40.
  • "Time Frames, Voluntary Acts, and Strict Liability," Law and Philosophy, 12, (1993):163-90.
  • "On Punctate Content and Conceptual Role," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3, (1993):653-60.
  • "The Connectionism/Classicism Battle to Win Souls," Philosophical Studies, 71, (1993):163-90.
  • "Systematicity, Conceptual Truth, and Evolution," Philosophy, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement no.34 (1993):217-34. [Reprinted in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, eds. C. Hookway and D. Peterson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.217-34.]
  • "The Allure of Connectionism Reexamined," Synthese, 101, (1994):365-400. (With T.A. Warfield.)
  • "Distinctions Without a Difference," Southern Journal of Philosophy, 33, Spindel Issue on Vagueness, (1994):203-53. (With Vann McGee.)
  • "Dennett's Logical Behaviorism," Philosophical Topics, 22, (1994):189-258. (With John Hawthorne.)
  • "Epiphenomenalism," in A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed. S. Guttenplan (Blackwell, 1994), pp.275-286.
  • "The Public/Private Distinction," in A Companion to Metaphysics, eds. J. Kim and E. Sosa (Blackwell, 1994), pp.421-23.
  • "Dispositions," in A Companion to Metaphysics, eds. J. Kim and E. Sosa (Blackwell, 1994), pp.120-123.
  • "Varieties of Supervenience," in Supervenience: New Essays, eds. E. Savello and O Yalcin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.16-59. [Reprinted in Essays in Analytical Metaphysics, ed. Michael Tooley (Garland Publishing), 1999. Reprinted in The International Research Library of Philosophy, ed. Jaegwon Kim (Ashgate Publishing Limited), 2002.]
  • "Lewis on What Distinguishes Perception From Hallucination," in Problems in Perception, ed. K. Akins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp.198-231.
  • "On the Very Possibility of Self-Deception," Self and Deception, eds. R. Ames and W. Dassayke (SUNY University Press, 1996), pp.11-25.
  • "Classical Constituents in Smolensky's ICS Architecture," Structures and Norms in Science, eds. M.L.D. Chiara, K. Doets, D. Mundici, and J. van Bentham (Kluwer, 1996), pp.331-43.
  • "Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination," Philosophical Perspectives, 11, (1997):209-230.
  • "Emergence and Supervenience," Intellectia, 25, (1997):25-43.
  • "Externalism, Twin-Earth, and Self-Knowledge," in Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays on Self-Knowledge, eds. C. Wright, C. Macdonald, and B. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Prfess, 1998), pp.285-320. [Section entitled "The Brown-McKinsey Charge of Inconsistency," reprinted in Anti-Individualism and Self-Knowledge, eds. P. Ludlow and N. Martin (CSLI Publications, Stanford, 1998), pp.207-214.]
  • "Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access?" Philosophical Review, 107, (1998):349-380. (With Michael Tye.)
  • "There are Fewer Things Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIX, (1999):445-454. (With Christopher Hill.)
  • "Color and Color Space," Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol.5, Epistemology (2000), pp.83-89.
  • "Hermeneutique Cosmique," Philosophiques, 27, (2000):63-76.
  • "What Dennett's Intentional Systems Theory Won't Vindicate Folk Psychology," Protosciology, 14, (2000):145-157.
  • "Skepticism, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge," The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. LXXIV, (2000):93-118.
  • "Lessons of the Many," Philosophical Topics, Vol.28, (2000): 129-51. (With Vann McGee.)
  • "Introspecting Thoughts" Facta Philosophica, 3, (2001): 77-83.
  • "In Defense of New Wave Materialism: A Response to Horgan and Tienson," in Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. B. Loewer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.317-328. [Reprinted as "Zur Verteidigung des New-Wave Materialismus" in M. Paun and A. Stephan (eds.) Phaenomenales Bewusstsein: Rueckkehr zur Identitaetstheorie? Paderborn: mentis, 2001, pp. 208-221.]
  • "Color, Consciousness, and Color Consciousness" in ed. Quintin Smith's New Essays on Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) pp.97-154.
  • "Vitalism and Emergence," in Cambridge History of Philosophy: 1870-1945, ed. T. Baldwin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 629-637.
  • "Computational, Connectionism, and the Philosophy of Mind," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information ed. L. Floridi (Blackwell, 2003), pp. 135-51.
  • "McKinsey's Challenge, Warrant Transmission, and Skepticism,' in New Essays on Semantic Externalism, Skepticism, and Self-Knowledge ed. Susana Nuccetelli (Cambridge, Mass. MIT, 2003), pp. 79-96.
  • "A Naturalist-Phenomenal Realist Response To Block's Harder Problem," Philosophical Issues, 13, (2003):163-204.
  • "The Place of Color in Nature," in Colour: Connecting the Mind to the Physical World, eds. R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.475-505.
  • "Logical Commitment and Semantic Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson," Linguistics and Philosophy, 26, (2003):637-650. (With Vann McGee.)
  • "Why Not Color Physicalism Without Color Absolutism?" Behavorial Brian Sciences, 26, (2003):34-35. (With Zoltan Jakab)
  • "Have Noë and Thompson Cast Doubt on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Program?" Journal of Consciousness Studies, 11, (2004):56-67. (With Gary Bartlett)
Encyclopedia and Philosophical Dictionaries
  • "The Philosophy of Mind," in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. R. Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp.597-606.
  • "Mental Causation," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, ed. Borchert (Macmillan, 1996), pp.331-34.
  • "Supervenience," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, ed. Borchert (Macmillan, 1996), pp.558-60.
  • "Epiphenomenalism," in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds. R. Wilson and F. Keil (MIT, 1997), pp.274-276.
  • "Emergence," in MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds. R Wilson and F. Keil (MIT, 1997), pp.266-268.
  • "Anomalous Monism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.1, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.276-280.
  • "Perception: Epistemic Issues," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.276-280.
  • "Connectionism," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.570-579.
  • "Information Semantics," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.7, ed. E. Craig (Routledge, 1997), pp.659-662.
  • "Physicalism and Alternatives," International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences eds. N.J. Smelser and P. B. Baltes (Pergamon, Oxford 2001), pp.11422-11427.
  • "Supervenience," Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science (Macmillan), in press.
  • "Supervenience," Stanford On Line Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Stanford University Press), in preparation.
Book Reviews
  • Review of Brian Loar's Mind and Meaning, in Review of Metaphysics (1987): 589-90.
  • Review of Fred Dretske's Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, C, Philosophical Review (1991): 641-45.
  • Review of Tim Crane's The Contents of Experience, in Canadian Philosophical Review, xiii, (1993): 8-13. (With Gene Witmer.)
  • Review of Patricia Churchland and Terence Sejnowski's The Computational Brain, in The Philosophy of Science, 63, (1996): 137-39.
  • Review of Stephen White's The Unity of the Self, in The Journal of Philosophy, 97, (1997): 638-44.
  • Review of Timothy Williamson's Vagueness, in Linguistics and Philosophy, 21, (1998): 221-231. (With Vann McGee)
  • "Why Tom Sawyer Stood on His Head," a review of Timothy Williamson's Knowledge and its Limits, in Times Literary Supplement, July 14, 2002, pp. 12-13. (With John Hawthorne.)


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